Christoph Sprenger: Katalogdaten im Frühjahrssemester 2020
|Name||Herr Dr. Christoph Sprenger|
Institut f. Informationssicherheit
ETH Zürich, CNB F 108
|Telefon||+41 44 632 75 56|
|263-4600-00L||Formal Methods for Information Security||5 KP||2V + 1U + 1A||R. Sasse, C. Sprenger|
|Kurzbeschreibung||The course focuses on formal methods for the modelling and analysis of security protocols for critical systems, ranging from authentication protocols for network security to electronic voting protocols and online banking.|
|Lernziel||The students will learn the key ideas and theoretical foundations of formal modelling and analysis of security protocols. The students will complement their theoretical knowledge by solving practical exercises, completing a small project, and using state-of-the-art tools.|
|Inhalt||The course treats formal methods mainly for the modelling and analysis of security protocols. Cryptographic protocols (such as SSL/TLS, SSH, Kerberos, SAML single-sign on, and IPSec) form the basis for secure communication and business processes. Numerous attacks on published protocols show that the design of cryptographic protocols is extremely error-prone. A rigorous analysis of these protocols is therefore indispensable, and manual analysis is insufficient. The lectures cover the theoretical basis for the (tool-supported) formal modeling and analysis of such protocols. Specifically, we discuss their operational semantics, the formalization of security properties, and techniques and algorithms for their verification.|
In addition to the classical security properties for confidentiality and authentication, we will study strong secrecy and privacy properties. We will discuss electronic voting protocols, and RFID protocols (a staple of the Internet of Things), where these properties are central. The accompanying tutorials provide an opportunity to apply the theory and tools to concrete protocols. Moreover, we will discuss methods to abstract and refine security protocols and the link between symbolic protocol models and cryptographic models.
Furthermore, we will also present a security notion for general systems based on non-interference as well as language-based information flow security where non-interference is enforced via a type system.